I. INTRODUCTION
In the following pages, I aim to review what the literature of political science has to say about the topic of reform of state and federal clemency processes. I then share what I would like to see change with respect to federal executive clemency. Admittedly, much of my thinking is influenced by the views of predecessors in my discipline. I then identify what I believe should be explicit goals and baselines for future assessment of the pardon power.
As a contextual matter, it is important to note that, at the time this article was written, Barack Obama was well into the seventh year of his presidency. At the close of 2015, his sixty-four pardons (which simply restored civil rights) and eighty-nine commutations (which reduced the length of prison sentences) render his administration one of the least merciful in history. Most of the very few (eight) presidents who have exercised clemency less than Obama have either served a single term or died before completing one. 1 In addition, President Obama has denied a record 9,007 clemency applications, 2 and 2,841 more have been "closed without presidential action." Despite the grim nature of these data, on July 13, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest suggested President Obama had taken a "historic step" because of "bold action" in the matter of sentence commutations. 4 Earlier in the day, it had been announced that forty-six had been granted, and the White House clumsily guessed it was the "largest number" of commutations "issued by a president on a single day dating back to at least the Johnson administration." 5 Earnest then attempted to press his point by arguing that President Obama's total number of commutations (eightynine) was "more than the number of commutations issued by the four previous presidents combined." 6 The Press Secretary's comments seemed not well thought out or far too reliant upon low levels of knowledge in his audience. While it was true that President Obama's eighty-nine commutations were higher than the combined total for the four previous presidents, it was also true that, together, those presidents granted eighty-eight. So, President Obama had "beaten" them by a grand total of one. The point of comparison was all the more awkward because the four previous presidents received a total of 16,104 sentence commutation applications, whereas President Obama, by that point, had received 17,156. In other words, he had received over a thousand more applications than the previous four presidents yet granted only one more commutation. Furthermore, President Obama had granted 988 fewer pardons than his four predecessors combined, each one of them topping his mere sixty-four pardons. 7 Regardless, it is safe to say that many have been looking to the president to do far more with respect to pardons and commutations than just a little better than recent presidents-most of whom were notoriously neglectful of the pardon power. It is disheartening to think that anyone would even think to use them as a benchmark for much of anything related to clemency (except failure).
At present, the good news is that there is palpable expectation that, in the closing months of his administration, President Obama will grant more commutations. Some see the potential for a hundred or so. Some see the possibility of literally thousands. 8 For whatever reason, the President's 4. Press Briefing by Josh Earnest, White House Press Secretary (July 13, 2015), https:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/13/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-7132015.
5. Id. In fact, it was the highest number of individual commutations of sentence granted since July 26, 1935, when Franklin D. Roosevelt granted 151 (many of which were for persons who violated federal narcotics laws).
6. Id. 7. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2. 8. In February 2015, the Washington Post reported that thirty-five thousand federal inmates had "applied to have their sentences shortened." Sari Horwitz, U.S. Clemency Effort, Slow to Start, Will Rely on an Army of Pro Bono Lawyers, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015) , https://www .washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-clemency-effort-slow-to-start-will-rely-on-anarmy-of-pro-bono-lawyers/2015/02/28/2ba8c6bc-bc42-11e4-8668-4e7ba8439ca6_story.html.
inexplicably parsimonious use of pardons does not seem to be on anyone's radar screen of concern.
If the President is-at last-going to show more than casual interest in clemency, it is hoped that he will do it sooner than later. A steady stream of commutations (and pardons) from now until the end of the term would be more ideal, for a variety of reasons. President Clinton's last-minute antics did very little positive for the pardon power (see further discussion below), and the nation does not need or deserve another stunt like his.
The saving grace is that, whether President Obama exercises clemency a few dozen times, several hundred times, or a thousand times between now and the end of the term, none of the thoughts and suggestions outlined below would require significant modification. Like several others who have given the clemency process serious thought over the years, I hold, as a basic premise, that there are a variety of systematic problems that can only be addressed by dramatic reorganization of the clemency process and reevaluation of the purposes and goals of the pardon power. These problems were around long before President Obama came to Washington. Hopefully they will not hang around much longer.
II. THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND REFORM
For many years now, it has been somewhat of a tradition for political scientists and academics in the legal profession to pass each other like ships in the night when writing about the pardon power. Even when focusing on the same events, ideas, and concerns, there has been precious little crosspollination. Consequently, there has been little of the benefit derived from rigorous examination of the topic from a variety of perspectives, each with their particular strengths and insights. When the University of St. Thomas invited political scientists to its symposium on "Sentence Commutations and Executive Pardon Power" in April 2012, and in the pages of its Law Journal, 9 it took a bold, refreshing, progressive step. The 2015 symposium, "Reviewing Clemency in a Time of Change" and this issue of the Law Journal represent nothing less.
That being said, this section will focus on what political scientists have had to say about the topic of reforming clemency processes. In volume nine of this Review, I reviewed and assessed the literature appearing in the journals of political science and/or written by those in the discipline. 10 Readers of that piece are certainly cognizant of the fact that this vast literature has not been blind to concerns for the need for change, adaptation, and sometimes reform. 
A. Early Critiques and the Progressive Movement
Francis Lieber's On Civil Liberty and Self-Government featured a "paper on the abuse of the pardoning power" as a second appendix.
11 After enumerating nine "disastrous consequences" of the "arbitrary use" of pardons, 12 Lieber suggested those consequences had "shown themselves" to "an alarming degree" in the United States and that "in many parts of the country," were "on the increase."
13
But Lieber argued public confidence could be regained if each state created a "Board of Pardon" with members appointed by the legislature. 14 He further recommended that pardons should only be issued by the governor when recommended by the board, 15 and that decisions to grant clemency should be published in advance of the actual grants, as well as the reasons for each decision. 16 Lieber predicted that if such boards were established, "a series of fair principles and rules" would, "in a short time," be "settled by practice, and the pardon [power] would be far less exposed to arbitrary action."
17 Fourteen years later, when he wrote about proposed amendments to the New York Constitution, 18 Lieber remained convinced that there was "[n]o better way of moderating the pardoning power" than by establishing a pardon board to work "in conjunction with the executive power."
19
Theodore Roosevelt echoed Lieber's positions in a 1913 piece written for the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (henceforth "The Annals"). Roosevelt described the pardon power as "one of the most objectionable points" in our criminal justice system 20 and pointed to a New York Times article which reported many governors complained about having little time for clemency decisions. Thus, they "advocated" the creation of pardon boards in their respective states.
21 Roosevelt thought such boards should be composed of governors and appointed "non- political" persons of "high integrity and sound judgment" equipped with their own "secretary and office staff."
22
In the same year, The Annals featured an article by Herbert S. Hadley, the Governor of Missouri, who also felt governors needed to "be relieved from the burden and responsibility of dealing with [pardon applications]." 23 He felt this was especially so because governors were "peculiarly subject to and liable to unwarranted and malicious attacks by sensational and unscrupulous newspapers for granting executive clemency," and because it was easy "to mislead and to prejudice the public" against "a proper policy of executive clemency." 24 Hadley guessed, however, that if pardons were administered by a board, decisions "would assume something of the form of a judgment of a court" and "better and more complete investigation[s]" would be possible. 25 Hadley also thought such boards would be largely insulated from "unwarranted attacks and misrepresentations."
26
By 1914, William W. Smithers of the Philadelphia Bar asserted it was "generally conceded" that "some advisory board should hear [clemency] applications and make recommendations" to governors for the sake of "regularity, publicity and careful consideration." 27 In his view, governors were not using the pardon power enough, even though an executive's "oath to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' include[d] the declaration that he will maintain the constitution which confers upon him the pardoning power."
28 As far as Smithers was concerned, withholding a pardon in a "proper case" was no more acceptable than refusing to "call out the militia when the preservation of public peace demand[ed] it." 29 Smithers suggested, however, that governors were reluctant to pardon because of the "fallacy of the traditional, vindictive punishment of criminals" and "futile" nature of attempts to "diminish crime by statutes fixing a definite penalty for a specified offense."
30 He thus encouraged executives not to "shrink from exercising the pardoning power" 31 because there was a measure of "abuse" in the "failure" to act. Indeed, prisons were packed with individuals incarcerated "years ago" under "rigid impersonal and mechanical criminal laws" and "many inmates . . . could and ought to be free."
32 Thus, Smithers advised executives to do more than simply re- There, Frederick A. Cleveland presented a paper on the "reorganization" of the federal government. 34 Cleveland "questioned whether the [federal] 'pardons' process should be [housed] in the 'prosecuting' department" (the Department of Justice). 35 In his mind, the prosecution should be "kept out," or placed "very far in the background," when it came to assessing clemency applications. 36 Instead, this "public function" should be "transferred" to some "group" that had, as a primary purpose, an "outworking of the problem of social reconstruction." 37 More specifically, Cleveland suggested the creation of a Bureau of Parole, Probation, and Pardons that would be housed under the Assistant Secretary for Public Welfare. 38 Ten years later, Clair Wilcox wrote that the pardon power had been "frequently abused by governors because they "yielded to political pressure."
39 But he also believed pardons placed an "unfairly heavy burden" on governors who did not actually "have the time" to "properly" consider applications-which is why some states had created agencies and boards to advise and assist with the process.
40

B. Humbert's Assessments of the Pardon Power
Like Frederick Cleveland before him, W.H. Humbert expressed both general and specific concerns about federal executive clemency. His analysis of the topic was unique, however, because of its exceptional emphasis on empirical data. Humbert observed commutations were quite common for the better part of five decades (1860-1941, see Figure 1 ). Without presenting any data on the matter, he guessed that the apparent dominance of pardons from 1860 to 1884 may actually have been the result of "a failure to name properly in every case the form of clemency granted." 44 Pardons that terminated sentences and restored civil rights were recorded in an identical fashion to pardons that simply restored civil rights. This guess seems reasonable given what is now known about clemency practices in even earlier administrations. Zachary Taylor (1849-1850), for example, signed thirty-eight clemency warrants. But eight of his pardons and eight of his remissions also included "discharge" of a prisoner from custody. The word "commutation" simply was not used in the warrants, or in official record keeping. 46 warrants signed by James K. Polk (1845-1849) involved the "discharge" of prisoners, without any mention whatsoever of "commutations of sentence." 47 It was not until the late 1800s that clemency warrants began to regularly use the label "commutation" when the length of prison sentences, or the amount of fines, were reduced (as is the consistent practice today). In sum, it seems safe to say that commutations of sentence (in the modern sense of the language) were probably much more common than the left side of Figure 1 indicates.
Humbert also observed a second trend that began in 1895: "[T]he President disclosed consistently and impressively" an "inclination toward" granting "pardons to restore civil rights." 48 In the first three decades of the data, less than 10 percent of the annual grants of clemency involved mere restoration of rights. 49 By 1905, however, the percentage had crossed the 50 percent mark. 50 By 1935, 66 percent of the annual grants were pardons to restore rights.
51
When looking at Figure 1 , it is also worth remembering that while Humbert's data extended to 1936, his book was actually published in 1941. Thus, it is certain that he was aware of the continuing nosedive in commutations of sentence from 1937-1940 (the far right of the chart). Consequently, Humbert observed that, after the opening of the twentieth century, presidents "largely departed" from "the most beneficial forms of clemency" (commutations of sentence) and gravitated to forms which did not "disturb as drastically the original sentence of the courts" (pardons to restore civil rights).
52
In a separate chart, 53 Humbert presented data on the total number of pardon applications in comparison with the number of grants and denials in each year. For purposes of consistency, these data have also been extended to 1941 (see Figure 2) . Figure 2 is striking both for the manner in which it reflects current trends (as will be shown) and the manner in which it reflects an inclination toward mercy that has long since passed. Across the eight decades of data, in almost every year represented, presidents granted more pardons than they denied. This generosity is, of course, dwarfed by the increasing number of clemency applications that were being filed. Year to year, applications were not being addressed at all, so pending applications combined with incoming applications to create quite a mess. One would guess that this backlog-in and of itself-might have attracted some atten- If the inability of the President to consider every request for clemency was not apparent in the early days of the government, it became evident with the increase in clemency cases [from 1910-1936] . . . . As a consequence, acts of clemency increased in number but the growth did not keep pace with the increase of requests for executive clemency. 54 Humbert's work perhaps remains the most pertinent and compelling today for several reasons. First, his writing and analysis exhibited greater depth than most before and after him. Second, his work is-quite impressively-data-driven. Finally, as will be seen, the problems Humbert identified in his data remain to this day. They are only more exaggerated. Hence, his prescriptions for the pardon power remain well worth additional consideration.
The Pardoning Power of the President concluded with a discussion regarding potential reforms. 55 Recommendations on applications for clemency of United States Judges and Attorneys should not be relied upon to as great an extent in the future as in the past in deciding what should be done with applications for clemency. . . . Because of the nature of the information which a judge receives on a case, because of the danger of partiality which the experiences of a judge in criminal cases engender, and because of insufficient time to collect facts relevant to a decision in clemency cases, the United States Judge's recommendations should be critically examined. The judges imposed the sentence and they are loathe to admit any error in the original sentence. Secondly, if developments following the imposition of the sentence show the desirability of a pardon, the judges may not be in a position to appreciate the subsequent factors demanding clemency . . . . This last objection applies with equal force to the practice of relying upon the recommendations of the United States Attorneys. The United States Attorneys who frequently reach their offices because of political preferment, are often fired with a zeal to make a record by numerous convictions in order to secure further promotion. Their ardor may bring about a great number of convictions, some of which were unwarranted. But will these men be willing, afterwards, to recommend clemency in the cases in which over-zealousness brought about a wrongful conviction or too severe a sentence? 56 Humbert also presented a second line of recommendations aimed at "better results" in the use of the pardoning power. 57 He saw, for example, a need for "impartial studies of detailed data on each applicant for clemency, including the data submitted by the United States Attorneys and Judges . . . ." 58 Humbert argued "accurate, impartial, and scientific" information of this kind would ensure more reasonable decisions by the executive branch without the assistance of others and "greater uniformity of treatment." 59 Finally, he suggested that a "small board" should be created and equipped with a staff to conduct these "impartial studies."
60
C. Post-Watergate Analyses
In 1989, David Gray Adler concluded the pardon power had, "on the whole," been "judiciously administered, and so the country has been well served."
61 But pre-conviction pardons (such as that of Richard Nixon) convinced him there was reason enough to "rethink the constitutional structure 56 Christopher E. Smith and Scott P. Johnson also agreed that "the appropriate scope" of the pardon power deserved "examination and reassessment" in light of the possibility that presidents "could halt criminal proceedings in order to suppress information about his own misdeeds." 65 In their view, the "most desirable" protection would be to disallow pardons before trial. 66 A reasonable "alternative approach," however, would be a "requirement that the President specify charges when issuing a pardon" so that "unspecified charges would remain fair targets for prosecution." 68 Dinan reviewed the records of more than 230 state constitutional conventions and "examine[d] the distinctive conceptions of the pardon power that had prevailed at the state level." 69 The data revealed most states chose to "deviate" from the federal model, by the creation of advisory boards, councils, or some body of persons that shared the power with the governor. 70 Many states required "advance notice that a pardon [was] being considered." 71 Others "demand[ed] that pardons be accompanied by reasons for their issuance," 72 and most states explicitly prohibited pre-conviction pardons.
73
As for the question of whether federal practice should be informed by developments in the states, Dinan guessed presidents might not be as personally involved in the pardon process as governors, so many of the concerns behind the need for independent decision-making bodies might not apply. 74 In addition, presidents already have the Office of the Pardon Attorney in the Department of Justice to process applications and make recom- mendations. Yet Dinan also worried "contemporary presidents" have become "more susceptible . . . to entreaties from pardon applicants and their friends and families." 75 One possible solution might be an executive order by each incoming president creating an advisory body.
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
As the previous sections document, political scientists have long held an interest in executive clemency reform. The general themes most prominent in the literature are clear: clemency is (or should be) an important part of the business of the state and federal executives. Where it is clear that clemency systems are broken or dysfunctional, an obvious solution is to create a separate body to assist with the processing of applications and decision-making. That body should not usurp the executive's power but simply assist in the administration of clemency.
Is the federal clemency process working today? Is it functioning properly? Figure 3 represents an update of Humbert's initial concerns regarding the granting of pardons (to merely restore civil rights) and commutations of sentence. As can be seen, commutations of sentence have become a kind of freakish rarity, every now and then disappearing altogether from the landscape of the data.
76 Figure 3 constitutes cause for celebration if every person that has been tried has been tried fairly, every person that has been convicted was truly guilty, every plea-bargained sentence has been fair, every mandatory sentence has perfectly fit the crime, every person imprisoned has committed the very worst of crimes, every person has not served an acceptable amount of time, and no one has exhibited any signs whatsoever of remorse or rehabilitation. In that case, the American system of criminal justice has been a phenomenal success. However, it is easy enough to guess that the situation has been otherwise. With a burgeoning federal prison population of over 200,000 persons and the receipt of about 8,500 commutation requests in eight years, this advisory record amounts to the assertion that the system is essentially perfect -injustices never occur, sentences are never excessive, circumstances never change, and mercy is never appropriate. No reasonable person really believes that. Before moving to Humbert's second area of concern, it is also worthy to note that even the overall number of pardons has been in decline for some time. There may be a variety of explanations for short-term trends across the chart (see discussion below), but the long-term trend is also worthy of our attention. Many discussions entirely omit, for example, the very legitimate argument that there has been increasingly less justification or need for pardoning, especially commutations of sentence. After all, in the 1700s and 1800s, pardons were often used to look into places and corners where "the law" was blind, making distinctions where judges and juries were strictly unable to do so (for example, between adult and juvenile offenders, first-and second-degree murder and manslaughter, the sane and the insane, degrees of culpability based on stress and duress and/or the manipulating influence of others, etc.). Today, our laws are more sophisticated, refined, and specific to any number of distinctions.
In the early 1900s, the creation of federal alternative release mechanisms, probation and parole, reduced the need for prisoners to go through all of the hoops to seek commutations of sentence from the president-and the need for the presidents to grant them. Surely analyses that fail to take such institutional changes into consideration are deeply flawed.
Finally, the criminal process itself was radically transformed in the time period covered by the data in Figure 3 . Critical decisions by the United States Supreme Court announced and applied the exclusionary rule, first to the states, 78 then to federal law enforcement offices. 79 The Court also issued landmark decisions regarding legal representation, 80 juvenile defendants, 81 plea bargaining, 82 and cruel and unusual punishment. 83 Consequently, today's pre-trial criminal processes are more elaborate (and rights-oriented) than criminal trials were in the 1800s, where a trial, jury deliberation, and sentencing might all be completed in a single hour! 84 The possibility of human error remains, to be sure, but the elaborate nature of rights-oriented pre-trial criminal processes has-without doubt-had an impact, limiting presidential opportunities to make many due-process-type judgments once commonly made via the pardon power. number of requests that have been granted and the number that have been denied. In 1941, Humbert expressed concern that clemency applications were not being processed nearly as quickly as they were coming in. That situation has only gotten much worse. Across eight decades of Humbert's data, presidents just about always granted more pardons than they denied. Across the seven decades in Figure 4 , denials are just about always more common than grants, so much so that for a considerable part of the last three decades, grants are barely visible on the chart. Were it not for three massive waves of denials toward the right side of the chart (2002, 2008 , and 2011), the figures for pending cases would have probably been much higher.
IV. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DECLINE OF CLEMENCY
Why do presidents today deny many more pardons than they grant? Why are commutations of sentence so freakishly rare? If the bureaucracy created to facilitate the pardon process is slow, plodding, and just about always denies the applications that it receives, is it really working as it should?
A. The 1960s and Nixonian Politics
Many have argued that the "Law and Order" campaigns of Richard Nixon-in combination with (if not prompted by) public concern about crime as a major problem facing the nation 85 -ushered in a kind of hardline emphasis on retribution in the criminal justice system, which remains dominant to this day, especially in the hearts and minds of state and federal prosecutors and in the halls of the Department of Justice. In this punitive environment, to grant pardons is to be "soft on crime" and to set oneself up for negative electoral consequences. A variety of statistical analyses have shown some support for this view. 86 Anecdotally, Lyndon Johnson was criticized for "opening prison doors" and "coddling criminals" when he commuted the prison sentence of an organized crime figure from Cleveland, Ohio, John Alfred Gay. In 1967, the Cleveland Plain Dealer ran a thirteen-part series on Gay's case and discovered the commutation was granted over the objection of the U.S. At- torney's Office. The U.S. Pardon Attorney then admitted that none of the references in Gay's clemency application were "checked." Johnson, who had averaged about seventy commutations of sentence a year to that point, just about dropped them altogether. The next eighteen months of his administration featured a mere five commutations, 87 and they have not reemerged as a regular part of presidential business since.
But, again, the general argument is that rhetoric and concerns about crime ushered in a new age of hyper-emphasis on retributive justice. Other classic goals in sentencing (rehabilitation, reform, restoration, etc.) simply fell to the wayside.
B. Ford's Pardon of Nixon
With no small amount of irony, on September 8, 1974, Gerald Ford found himself granting a full and unconditional pardon to Richard Nixon. Gallup found 53 percent of Americans disagreed with the pardon, and only 38 percent supported it. 88 Ford, who began the term with approval ratings above 70 percent, saw his numbers drop twenty points by the end of the month. 89 By the end of the year, his approval rating fell to 42 percent and he averaged only 44 percent for the remainder of the term. 90 Research has since verified what pundits and almost every casual observer assumed at the time: Ford's pardon of Nixon went a long way toward Jimmy Carter winning the presidency. 91 The concern over the potential connection between pardons and electoral politics was strengthened.
C. Structural Changes in the Carter Administration
Some have attributed the recent decline in pardoning to a factor far less prone to dramatization: institutional change in the Department of Justice. Jimmy Carter's attorney general, Griffin Bell, informally passed his "clemency tasks and overseeing responsibilities" to the deputy attorney general.
92 Attorneys general have since followed suit. Consequently, the task of advising the president on pardons was assumed by "lower-ranking" officials who were, in a sense, more distant from the president and "more 87 concerned with punishment than mercy" (or the retributive justice model discussed above).
93
D. The "Willie Horton" Effect
In a Democratic primary debate during the 1988 presidential election, Senator Al Gore took issue with a Massachusetts furlough program in an attempt to score political points off of an opponent, Governor Michael Dukakis. The Los Angeles Times reported:
Gore went after Dukakis again when, given the opportunity to question him directly, he brought up a prison reform program that Dukakis had sponsored in Massachusetts, which granted weekend passes to prisoners, including some serving life sentences for murder. As Gore noted, 11 of these convicts failed to return, and two committed murders. . . . "If you were elected President, would you advocate a similar program for federal penitentiaries?" Gore asked to hoots and laughter from the audience.
94
When Governor Dukakis eventually became the Democratic Party's nominee, George H.W. Bush began referring to the same program in public speeches and to one beneficiary in particular. 95 Willie Horton committed a particularly brutal murder in 1974 and, over a decade later, was released on the weekend furlough program in question while serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
96 After ten such releases, however, Horton did not return to prison. As a fugitive, he raped a woman twice, violently assaulted a friend of the victim, and stole an automobile. 97 In September 1988, a Republican-leaning political action committee ran a thirty-second ad comparing the views of Bush and Dukakis on the death penalty and referred to the weekend furlough program. 98 It noted first-degree murderers had been granted such "weekend passes" and showed a mug shot of Horton. 99 The following month, the Bush campaign produced its own ad, which did not mention Horton by name but once again referred to the "Dukakis furlough program." 100 Critics attempted to blunt any potential effectiveness of the ads by claiming their content was unacceptably "racial," if not outright racist. 101 While additional details could certainly be recounted here, the pardon power had nothing whatsoever to do with the core facts. Dukakis did not pardon Horton. No one else pardoned Horton. No one has ever pardoned Horton. He remains in prison.
102
A conventional wisdom developed, however, among many journalists, commentators, and scholars, which suggests governors have since shied away from the exercise of the pardon power (especially commutations of sentence) for fear that some recipient might turn out to be "the next Willie Horton." The "Willie Horton effect" has been utilized to explain the decline in presidential pardoning as well. Governors and presidents can hardly expect any electoral advantage as a result of pardoning, but the potential for negative consequences (if not outright disaster) when the "next Willie Horton" shows up is enormous. As the explanation goes, the conclusion of the calculus is straightforward enough: it is just better and smarter to err on the side of caution by doing as little as possible or nothing at all. 103. Wisconsin's Scott Walker is perhaps the best example of a governor (and presidential hopeful) who has driven this strategy over the cliff wildly. After his inauguration on January 3, 2011, Walker created a Pardon Advisory Board by executive order, then refused to appoint anyone to it. By November, he had granted no pardons and a spokesperson clumsily said he had no "plans" to grant pardons because he believed those "decisions" should "be left up to the courts." Walker announced his policy more explicitly in May 2012, saying, "I'm not issuing pardons on anything. Period." Six months later, form letters informed applicants the governor had "suspended" the pardon process "indefinitely." No further explanation was provided. In January 2013, Walker told reporters that he had actually not suspended the state's pardon process, but he just wasn't issuing any. He added that pardons "undermine the criminal justice system." Two months later, over 1,400 applications had been filed, but Walker explained that pardons were not "really" what he "campaigned on" or "talked about." Since the only people seeking pardons were "guilty of a crime" he would not be "undermining the actions" of juries and courts. In 
E. Clinton's Clemency Caper
President Clinton's last-minute pardons generated a level of public controversy that brought comparisons with the aftermath of Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon.
104 CNN reported the "vast majority" of the individuals pardoned were "unknown to the public."
105 107 MSNBC also focused on the efforts of Henley and noted the cofounder of "The Eagles" donated $180,000 in soft money to Democratic political committees in 1996, $2,000 to Hillary Clinton's Senate campaign and $2,000 to Al Gore. 108 The Vegas Sun, and a former roommate and classmate of former President Clinton while attending Oxford University and Yale Law School.
109
The investigative functions of the House Government Reform Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee powered up 110 and, in the minds of some, pardoning, for still yet another reason, became a high-wire maneuver without a net. Indeed, Clinton's successor, George W. Bush, waited longer than any other president in history (699 days) before granting the first pardon of his administration.
111 Eight years later, when he left office, Bush granted less than half as many pardons and commutations as Clinton.
112
Readers may find any (or all) of the above explanations lurking when writers and commentators focus on why we are where we are with respect to the pardon power. They are all plausible and informative, but disentangling their individual effects in any rigorous manner would be a difficult task. Moreover, many times, it is difficult enough to simply understand and explain what happens (or does not happen) within a single administration.
V. PRESIDENT OBAMA'S DISAPPOINTING RECORD
Consider President Obama and his promise of "Hope and Change." 113 During the campaign, he specifically addressed highly relevant hot-button criminal justice issues, like mandatory minimum sentences, 114 the disparate impact of laws on African Americans, 115 and his belief that America is a place where people should be given second chances. 116 The very clear expectation of many was that he would use the pardon power like no other 117 and it is easy to imagine he had little enthusiasm for such. Later, it became obvious that President Obama was going to retain George W. Bush's pardon attorney, Ronald Rodgers. That certainly did not strike anyone as an impressive display of interest in change, at least not with respect to pardons.
118
As record numbers of applications came in, and few grants were coming out, some wondered if the staff in the Office of the Pardon Attorney was up to the task. In 2009, a former U.S. pardon attorney openly offered that it was "hard to see how the small staff of the OPA (5 lawyers for most of Bush's tenure) could have given many of the cases denied [the] full review they deserved." 119 In the same year, a former staff attorney in that Office wrote:
The disintegration of the clemency advisory system is not simply a matter of applying an unduly strict standard of review but, rather, the abandonment of the review process altogether in many cases. eral's Office without conducting a meaningful review of a single one of these petitions. Instead, he has support staff prepare lists of names with basic sentencing information and attaches them to a cover memorandum, which asserts in boilerplate language that "a review of the contents of each petition establishes that none has merit." On this basis, he asserts that "there is no reason to conduct a further investigation by this office . . . ." While this reporting format has been used in the past in limited circumstances, it has never been thought appropriate to indiscriminately clear out a backlog of pending cases in this fashion. Given the sheer volume of cases involved, it is not physically possible that each petition was reviewed by OPA's small professional staff. In fact, none of these cases was even assigned to an attorney. Accordingly, there is little basis for asserting that each one is necessarily without merit. Moreover, even on the assumption that all of these cases would have ended up being denied anyway, in my view, this sort of superficial treatment invariably undermines the integrity of the advisory process . . . .
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These concerns, of course, became even more relevant when President Obama received record numbers of clemency applications, especially for commutation of sentence.
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Along the way, the notion was also floated (perhaps in desperation) that the President was just too busy with other things that were much more important: health care, war, national security, etc. This explanation was notably unconvincing for a number of reasons. In the 2008 campaign, when Senator John McCain proposed postponing a presidential debate in order to meet with congressional leaders to address the nation's financial crisis, Obama offered a terse rebuke:
Presidents are going to have to deal with more than one thing at a time. . . . It's not necessary for us to think that we can do only one thing, and suspend everything else.
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Although Obama may have been right, the days of presidents plowing through pardon applications are long gone. There is a considerable (and not inexpensive) bureaucracy that is supposed to do that. It is the job of that bureaucracy to forward recommendations to the president. If that bureaucracy is functioning properly, a steady flow of recommendations (and, Today, however, presidents will go many months without granting a single pardon or commutation of sentence. The time has come for change. Federal executive clemency is in dire need of reform. No one who is familiar with the current process defends it with any degree of enthusiasm, much less argues that it is effective, beneficial, and fair.
VI. STEPS TO REFORM
When all is said and done, the pardoning power is ultimately a presidential power. If the president is not concerned about, or at least mindful of, the critical necessity of mercy, then it really does not matter how much reorganizing and shuffling results from any reform-minded effort. On the other hand, the reforms suggested below might very well increase presidential interest in the prerogative of mercy because the changes suggested would have the net effect of regularizing the clemency process and encouraging more systematic consideration of applications. These changes would go a long way toward educating the public and restoring confidence in the pardon power. The existence of a more informed public would in turn dull the impact of hyperbolic and/or unfair criticism of pardons-long held to be a primary factor in executive hesitance to show mercy.
A. Relocate the Administration of Clemency
Frederick A. Cleveland was correct, in 1921, to suggest that the bureaucratic apparatus associated with the processing of clemency applications and forwarding recommendations to the president should be moved, by executive order, out of the Department of Justice. The creation of the Office of the Pardon Attorney was an outstanding idea for its time. 135 Presidents are busy, applications are many, and the specifics of requests are likely to be complex. It made perfect sense, as we transitioned to the modern presidency, to delegate authority to professional bureaucrats who could assist the president with recommendations 136 resulting from painstaking, deliberative processes guided by articulated goals, routinized behavior, the development of systemized norms, and-most of all-fairness. 136. Rather than shut down and/or grossly retard the clemency process.
But both Cleveland, in the 1920s, and Humbert, in the 1940s, saw the handwriting on the wall. Nesting the pardon power in the bureaucracy of the Department of Justice provided too much of an opportunity for the influence of judges and federal prosecutors-while certainly noteworthy, and important-to have lopsided impact on the bureaucratic development of the clemency process and, eventually, the application of the pardon power itself. Toss in a cubic ton or two of inflexible, heavy-handed punitive decision-making and the retributive justice model. Then, sprinkle in modern telecommunications, the contemporary news cycle, and the ability for a story to be reported, manipulated, and styled in any number of ways to shock readers, spark debate, and set decision-makers back on their heels. Before you know it, the pardon power is no longer a relevant, plausible, and serious executive check on either the legislative or judicial branches. It seems clear enough that this is exactly the situation we are in. The pardon process needs to be moved closer to the president, perhaps in the Executive Office of the President.
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Samuel Morison, again, a former staff attorney at the Office of the Pardon Attorney (for thirteen years) has written:
Whatever utility [the] arrangement once had, the structural deficiencies in the existing [pardon] advisory system have rendered it dysfunctional. Under the circumstances, I submit that the President has a constitutional obligation to remove the advisory role from the Justice Department, and reconstitute it within the Executive Office of the President, where it can operate without the burden of an entrenched conflict of interest.
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B. Adjust the U.S. Pardon Attorney's Tenure
The tenure of U.S. pardon attorneys should be changed to coincide with the arrival and departure of each president. The pardon attorney should not be a nameless, faceless bureaucrat held over from years past and perhaps even appointed by a president of a different political party. The position should reflect, as nearly as possible, the views and opinions of the president it is supposed to assist in clemency decision-making. If presidents want to outsource the actual selection process (as they do with lower federal court positions), so be it. Even the pretense of interest-by forcing the ne-137. "To provide the President with the support that he or she needs to govern effectively, the Executive Office of the President (EOP) was created in 1939 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The EOP has responsibility for tasks ranging from communicating the President's message to the American people to promoting our trade interests abroad. Overseen by the White House Chief of Staff, the EOP has traditionally been home to many of the President's closest advisors." Executive Office of the President, The Administration, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
138. Samuel Morison, Saving Grace: Salvaging the Pardon Advisory System, AM. CONSTITU-TION SOC'Y BLOG (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/saving-grace-salvaging-thepardon-advisory-system. cessity of a timely appointment-would be an improvement over the current circumstance.
C. Create a Clemency Board / Commission
As the discussion of the literature of political science documents, Lieber, Roosevelt, Hadley, Smithers, Cleveland, and Wilcox all saw the wisdom in the creation of a special board or commission to assist executives with clemency processes. While it is true that most of them were focusing on governors in the states, the logic of their arguments seems quite applicable to the presidents of today. The states, of course, have often operated as laboratories of democracy, 139 where ideas and policies have been tested. The literature on "policy diffusion" in political science and public administration has established that governments can-and do-learn from each other.
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As of December 2015, six states administer the pardon power by independent boards 141 and an additional twenty states have created advisory boards. 142 It is noteworthy that in eleven of the fifteen states where pardoning occurs most frequently today, the power is administered by such boards. On the other hand, a recent analysis notes that in the twenty-four states where the pardon power is almost completely centralized into the hands of the governor, the output in twenty of those states can be best described with words like "infrequent," "sparing," and "rare."
143 From today's standpoint, Gerald Ford's Presidential Clemency Board (created to handle thousands of cases of draft evasion) appears to be both a logical step in the development and evolution of thinking about the pardon power and an idea ahead of its time. 144 Today, it is apparent that it would be useful to create a permanent board or commission-again, outside of the Department of Justice-to assist the president with decision making on clemency applications.
145 Such a board should not limit, or be able to limit, the president's power in any way shape or form. It should only assist the president. "Assistance," however, should mean more than mere existence. The creation of such an institution should be accompanied by a clear set of baseline expectations.
While the number of persons serving on the board might be a point of contention, a more important issue would be its composition or makeup. It would be horribly wrong to stack it with (or require members to have experience as) prosecutors and judges (who are often former prosecutors). A more intelligent route would be to allow such persons to serve (especially prosecutors and judges who have recommended clemency on behalf of applicants in the past) and include the pardon attorney, as well as one advisor assistant from the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
146 When filling positions, however, primary emphasis should be placed on finding persons with experience on the defense side of the criminal justice equation, probation and parole officers, sentencing experts, prison officials, scholars who have researched and written about clemency, attorneys who have successfully represented clemency applicants, and persons who can demonstrate at least some minimal interest in matters related to criminal justice, especially the post-conviction universe.
D. Produce, Track, and Publish Relevant Data
Remarkably, a former U.S. Pardon Attorney has described the Justice Department's clemency program as "hard to understand and even harder to penetrate, operating in secret and accountable to no one." 147 The clemency board proposed here would present an annual report (separate from the Annual Report of the attorney general-see comments below) that sheds considerable light on what it has done and how it has done it. The report should provide elaborate, useful data that allow for intelligent assessment of the efficiency of the processing of applications. This kind of information should not be the by-product of a special, expensive study funded by federal grant money.
148 It should be the daily work product of the clemency board. 148. One such effort observed that, while the Office of the Pardon Attorney utilized "few written policies and procedures for processing clemency applications," on average, it took almost two years to process an application resulting in positive grants. The figure for pardons was 3.27 years and 1.57 years for commutations of sentence. But "a significant cause" of delay in processing applications was due to the fact that "the entities receiving referrals [from the OPA] did not always respond [within] the period of time required by the entities' internal guidelines or the For example, the number of recommendations forwarded to the president should be tabulated by month. The amount of time that it takes the board to make such recommendations should be meticulously monitored as well. A series of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests once uncovered the adventures of an application filed in September 1998. A pardon was granted fourteen years later, in March 2013, after the application went through the Office of the Pardon Attorney four times, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General five times, and the White House three times. 149 It is safe to assume this was an extraordinary, exceptional circumstance. But that is exactly the point. No one should have to assume anything. There should be a clear, specific, regular public accounting.
150 Finally, the board should not be able to simply report that hundreds (or thousands) of applications are "closed without presidential action" without further elaboration.
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Tables in an annual report should provide more specific information on the broadest categories encompassed by that language. 150. Perhaps there should even be an "administrative inefficiency" or-as is used in little league baseball and adult league softball games around the nation, "skunk"-rule. Maybe any application that is not properly addressed within five or ten years should be automatically granted?
151. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2 (focusing on far right side of columns in Department of Justice data).
152. In response to a personal e-mail dated May 10, 2013, U.S. Pardon Attorney Ronald Rodgers explained the aggregation of data in this category as follows:
You have asked whether we are able to 'provide any insights on how one might go about disaggregating the data for the category labeled 'petitions denied or closed without presidential action' from 1945 to 1977, in order to bring it into line with data from 1978 forward.' Unfortunately, we are unable to provide you with any information as to how the data can be subdivided . Along similar lines, it would also be useful if the proposed clemency board were to have at least one academic, preferably a social scientist with training and skill in data collection and both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Again, every member of the board should always have a crystal clear sense of what it is doing, how it is doing it, and-perhaps most importantly-why, in comparison to previous boards. The need for such data was no more apparent than when many of Bill Clinton's last-minute pardons did not go through the "normal channels":
These infamous "last-minute" pardons were, in part, notable because they generated unprecedented interest in information about historical trends in the use of the pardoning power. while reporters from the Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor questioned whether "last-minute" pardons were "the norm."
157 For the first time, calls for empirical analysis of the presidential action if the petitioner withdraws the application or dies during the pendency of its consideration. Moreover, a pardon application will be closed administratively if the petitioner repeatedly fails to respond to a request by the Pardon Attorney for information necessary for the processing of his application. Further, a commutation application will be closed administratively if an applicant who seeks only reduction of his prison sentence is released from prison before the President takes action on his request. Finally, since a person is not eligible to seek commutation of sentence if he is challenging his conviction or sentence through litigation, a commutation application will be closed administratively if it is learned that the clemency applicant is simultaneously seeking relief from the courts. E-mail from Ronald Rodgers, U.S. Pardon Attorney, to P.S. Ruckman (May 10, 2013 pardon power were coming from outside the discipline of political science.
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In most instances, however, the search for data driven context came up empty-handed. "Experts"-some from within the Department of Justiceprovided anecdotes and relied upon their recent memory. Some even brought such reference points to congressional investigations. But no one could even produce data on the number of pardons granted by previous presidents that did not go through "normal channels." It was all sad, unimpressive guesswork.
159
If useful data are gathered, analyzed, and correctly understood, Lieber's hope that "a series of fair principles and rules" might be "settled by practice," and the pardon power could be protected from "arbitrary action." 160 Under the current system, it is so easy to imagine nothing like this is going on. Indeed, a former U.S. pardon attorney in the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton has said:
I can tell you that the system for reviewing cases and for getting cases, and the kinds of considerations that we brought to bear in the Department of Justice were really pretty random. . . . I can tell you that the degree of secrecy and randomness and inefficiency [in the present system] is extraordinary.
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E. Revamp the Annual Report of the Attorney General
Finally, the Annual Report of the Attorney General should return to the level of transparency that existed in its pages from 1885 to 1932. In that period, the name of each recipient of clemency was listed along with the state where he or she was tried, the offense(s), the date of sentencing, the sentence, the form of clemency, and, in many (if not most) instances, some explanation as to why clemency was granted. Disagreements between the president and the pardon attorney or attorney general were noted, as were 158. Ruckman, supra note 9, at 821. 159. In one instance, a former U.S. pardon attorney, speaking about Clinton's late pardons said, "this is the first time that I'm aware of that a huge number of pardons was done at the very end of the term." But that same individual was the U.S. pardon attorney in the previous administration, that of George H.W. Bush, who-like most presidents before him-granted the largest number of pardons in the fourth and final year of his term. Moreover, almost half of Bush's pardons and commutations of sentence were granted in the last month and half of his term-18 percent of his total falling in the last week. instances where applications did not go through "normal channels" and were decided upon directly by the president. 162 In addition to all of this information, the Annual Report should provide the date when each application was filed, so that there can be better public assessment of the process and those who are administering it. While it may be impractical to provide all of the same information for applications that are denied, some data should be provided which reveal the length of time that it takes for those applications to be processed as well.
VII. EXPECTATIONS, GOALS, AND ASSESSMENT
There was a time when presidents granted more pardons than they denied. Specific numerical quotas are probably inappropriate, but all of the authors in this issue are in agreement that the pardon power was not placed in the Constitution in order that presidents might neglect it. In Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton noted that criminal codes have an almost natural tendency toward over-severity. For that reason, he argued, there should be "easy access" to mercy.
163 By almost any standard or measure one might employ, it is impossible to reasonably conclude that there has been "easy access" to federal executive clemency in the United States, at least not in the last five decades.
A. More Pardoning
One underlying goal of the changes proposed here is an increase in use of the pardon power. Absent clear and convincing data that this or that year's applicants, as a group, are more serious offenders, less likely to have experienced rehabilitation, or that punishment continues to serve some public good, the number of clemency grants should at least moderately correlate with trends in federal convictions, time served by the prison population, and completion of sentences. When federal convictions and the prison population boom (as they have since the 1980s), and pardons and commutations of sentence decline precipitously, the clemency board should not conclude that it is the normal course of business. It should instead prepare reports that explain with terrific precision why the disparities exist.
At present, presidents can complain that they are not getting applications they want to see. 164 Deputy attorney generals can say they are recom-mending clemency, but presidents are not responding positively. 165 U.S. pardon attorneys can claim they are forwarding positive recommendations but their suggestions are being ignored. 166 This shell game should end.
If recommendations are being forwarded to the president, and the president is simply not acting on them, everyone should know. If recommendations are not being forwarded, everyone should know that as well. Aggregate data on the paths of clemency applications should be regularly charted. If applications tend to get log-jammed in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, or at any single point in the bureaucratic trail, everyone should know exactly where that point is. The tail should be explicitly pinned on the donkey(s), again, regularly.
167 Greater transparency is the best possible path to consistency and, consequently, fairness.
B. More Regular Pardoning
Whatever the flow of applications and recommendations, the tendency of pardons to be granted in the month of December, and more so in the fourth and last year of each term (and certainly the final days and hours of the term), should be consciously and valiantly resisted by all of the actors involved. For most of our nation's history, presidents granted pardons regularly throughout the term. A full month would not pass without a single pardon or commutation of sentence. Pardons were not so much newsworthy events as they were regular, expected occurrences-the residue of a general sense that presidents, as a matter of constitutional duty, were supposed to participate in our system of checks and balances. This all ended in the administration of Dwight Eisenhower. 168 grants of clemency over the last thirty-nine years have been in that month. 169 As I have noted elsewhere: Whatever merit there may be to the notion that the Scriptural narrative of the Crucifixion of Christ [it] certainly serves as a very poor building block for public understanding of federal executive clemency [and as a] model for clemency policy making, it is even more problematic. Indeed, the clear sense of the Crucifixion story is that the prisoner, Barabbas, was guilty and on his way to execution. But, because of "tradition," the arbitrary decision making of Pilate and the passions of a mob, Barabbas was the recipient of an extraordinary act of grace. The incident thus provides no consideration whatsoever for clemency as the result of a truly deliberative process. Nor does it consider clemency as the expected-if not well deserved-result of rehabilitation, or clemency following the expiration of a sentence. Indeed, the case of Barabbas serves as a remarkably poor baseline for the typical clemency application floating around in the Department of Justice, which does not involve the death penalty and, more often than not, features an applicant who has completed his/her sentence, properly addressed all associated fines and penalties and is simply seeking to have his/her civil rights restored. In sum, the more intelligent approach would be for the pardon power to be used more frequently and more evenly across the months of the year.
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While it is true that most presidents have granted the largest number of pardons in the fourth and last year of the term, the last-minute pardon bonanza of Bill Clinton was more unusual than anything else. 171 Still, lastminute pardoning invites the criticism that presidents are behaving in a manner to escape political accountability for their decision-making. In addition to calling the pardon power in question, deserving recipients are cast in a bad light as well.
C. Exercise of Group Pardons
Finally, in an era of mass incarceration, it is reasonable to hope for a day when pardons are granted more frequently and conspicuously as the product of explicit, methodical calculation toward the ends of justice and the public good. The economy has languished for some time now. Budgets are tight. Costly prisons cannot always be the go-to answer. Nor should they be, if there is a sense that alternative forms of punishment are more appropriate or more conducive to successful reincorporation into society.
There is a place for pardoning chicken stealing, coin mutilation, illegal sale of bald eagle feathers, lumber theft from government property, or em- bezzlement from national banks. But in an era of mass incarceration with over four thousand offenses in the U.S. criminal code and increasing concerns about overcriminalization, 172 it seems appropriate that a newly created clemency board can constantly remind itself that the clemency power can be appropriately exercised for classes of persons. Amnesties (or group pardons) are a great American tradition dating back to George Washington, 173 and a clemency board should always explore the possibility and appropriateness of such grants, in addition to individual grants.
This approach to clemency is quite common worldwide. In January of 2010, for example, the president of Manila granted eighteen commutations of sentence, giving special consideration to "health conditions and the age of the convicts." 174 One year earlier, over 500 prisoners were freed in Ghana when clemency was granted to categories of recipients including the following: nursing mothers guilty of non-bailable offenses, first-time offenders who had served more than half of their term, all first-time offenders above the age of seventy years, and all seriously ill prisoners not sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Exempt from the amnesty were offenders in those categories who were jailed for murder, armed robbery, rape, defilement, narcotics, threat of death, carrying offensive weapons, manslaughter, and escaping from lawful custody. 175 In January of 2015, 584 prisoners were released by decree in Egypt who had served at least fifteen years of life sentences or had served at least half of their six-month sentences. The decree excluded those convicted of crimes that harmed the government or crimes involving explosives, weapons and ammunition, drugs, illegal profiteering, bribes, and forgery. 176 In March, 2015, the president of Tunisia commuted almost 1,000 prison sentences on the basis of "objective criteria" focusing on "the gravity of the crime or the offence, length of sentence served and the penalty remaining to be executed. Other criteria such as first-time or repeat offender status and good conduct [were] determining." Detainees convicted of "serious crimes" (terrorist crimes, weapon trafficking, and smuggling) were excluded.
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In April 2013, "as many as 7,000" persons were released from prisons in Syria. The amnesty reduced death penalty sentences to life imprisonment and also covered "prisoners with incurable diseases and elders over 70." Also excluded were "political prisoners or those convicted of drug and weapon trafficking."
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The point is not so much to advocate for any of these particular examples of amnesty as appropriate in the United States. But there is a place for more regular, serious consideration of the delineation of particular classes of persons for federal executive clemency, based on explicitly stated policy goals, considerations of justice and the public good.
Currently, there are thousands of individuals in our federal prisons who were convicted of drug offenses and received harsh sentences under sentencing guidelines since rejected by both parties in both chambers of Congress. On August 2, 2010, Congress addressed disparities in crack and powder cocaine sentencing with passage of the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). 179 It reduced federal mandatory minimums and maximums for crack-related offenses to an 18:1 ratio (from a ratio of 100:1). Right away, there were concerns about whether or not the FSA should be applied retroactively. Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) issued a statement, which read, in part:
Retroactive application of the crack law by Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission could affect an estimated 21,000 prisoners over the next 30 years, reducing sentences by an average of almost four years. Enactment would result in substantial savings in prison costs-currently shouldered by overburdened American taxpayers-at no peril to public safety. Each prisoner requesting a sentence reduction would be considered individually, allowing courts to ensure that dangerous offenders are not returned to society early. . . . Congress must make the crack law retroactive. It's a matter of simple fairness . . .
[they] must provide relief to those already in prison serving stiff sentences for crack violations. It's only right that Congress show them the same compassion, fairness, and justice that the new law provides to those entering the prison system. 180 Courts also had to deal with more technical questions, such as whether or not appellants should be subject to the new guidelines if they were sentenced after the passage of the FSA, or whether the relevant point in time was when crimes were thought to have been committed. 181 Meanwhile record numbers of applications for commutations of sentence flew into the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
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On April 23, 2014, former Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole announced that the Department of Justice would "prioritize" commutation applications from inmates serving federal sentences who likely would have received a substantially lower sentence if convicted of the same offense(s) today; who were nonviolent, low-level offenders without significant ties to large-scale criminal organizations, gangs, or cartels; had served at least ten years of their prison sentence; did not have a significant criminal history; had demonstrated good conduct in prison; and had no history of violence prior to or during their current term of imprisonment.
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To date, Mr. Cole's program has yielded few positive results, but President Obama's administration is not yet over. A newly created clemency board should, again, constantly be mindful of the possibility of granting clemency to classes of persons. If we are going to incarcerate at high rates, we should be ever more mindful of ways to decrease the prison population in accordance with the ends of justice and the public good.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 1919, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's Annual Report argued that his duties and responsibilities had "increased so greatly" that it became "practically impossible" to give clemency applications "the attention and thought" that they required. 184 Palmer thus proposed the creation of a threemember Pardon and Parole Board that would make recommendations to the president. 185 Three years later, the American Civil Liberties Union sent a letter to President Harding calling for the creation of a "new agency" to process clemency applications. According to the Washington Post, the organization thought the Department of Justice was "unable" to "go into" cases in a proper manner because of its "organization," its "other many duties," and the dominant role of federal attorneys who conducted the pros-ecution. 186 It is so unfortunate that reform-minded persons did not win the day on these fronts a long, long time ago.
Many have high hopes that President Obama will exercise the pardon power more generously before his term finally ends. It is quite unfortunate that he has not exhibited more interest to date. But here we are. Unfortunately, if he grants record numbers of pardons and commutations of sentence between now and the end of the term, it may cause as much harm as good so far as public perceptions of the pardon power are concerned. The recommendations outlined above would, if implemented, prevent future presidents from ever finding themselves in such a predicament.
